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THE NEED FOR LAW REFORM
James D. Donathen *
INTRODUCTION
This note reviews the effect of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 on unit-based seniority systems established by an employer.
Decisions by United States district courts and Courts of Appeals, 2 and by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.), 3 have consistently
found unit seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of discrimination that-
began prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to constitute unlawful
employment practices within the meaning of Title VII.
These decisions, in which there was no conflict between any of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals, have been in accord with the purpose of Title VII: the
elimination of discrimination in employment. 4 In the past, in all circuits and
in E.E.O.C. decisions, the concept of unlawful employment practices has
included both overt practices as well as practices which, while neutral on their
face, "operate" in such a way as "to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices." 5
Despite this uniformity of law and administrative practice, the Supreme
Court recently reversed much of the established precedent regarding discriminatory
seniority systems. In Teamsters v. United States, 6 the Court, by a seven-to-two
vote, held that seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of pre-act
discrimination are lawful, provided that the seniority system itself was not
established or maintained with discriminatory intent.
Many employers base their seniority systems on intra-company production
units or departments. This type of system is particularly prevalent in industrial
firms, while less common in government agencies, service-oriented businesses,
and in foundations, universities and other not-for-profit organizations.
In a unit-based seniority system, pay scales, promotions and transfers are
based on the seniority which an individual employee has accrtied within the
specified unit or department, rather than on the basis of seniority accrued
within the firm as a -whole.
*A.B., University of Notre Dame, 1975; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 1978.
1. 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.
2. See text and notes at n. 32, infra.
3. See text and notes at n..33, infra.
4. McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
5. Griggs v. Duke PowerCo., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
6. 431 U.S. 325 (1977).
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There are, in some, instances, management advantages through the utilization
of unit-rather than company-based seniority systems.7 Prior to July 2, 1965,
however, which was the effective date of Title VII, unit-based seniority systems
often had the effect of fostering racial discrimination. Blacks were hired into
unskilled and poorly paid units, while whites were hired into skilled and better
paid units. The collective ,bargaining agreements prohibited employee transfers
between units, thereby ensuring that the units remained segregated. Additionally,
these agreements provided that pay scales, promotions within the units, and
lay-off and recall priorities were determined by unit seniority.
8
After 1965, employers gradually eliminated overt discriminatory practices
by hiring blacks into formerly all-white units and permitting blacks to transfer
into white units. Unit seniority, however, continued to determine employee
rights and benefits, including the newly granted ability to transfer between
units.9
Such transfers contain built-in limitations which discourage black employees
from transfering into more desirable units. First, the transfer to a new unit
usually means accepting the least skilled and lowest paid job in the new unit.
Second, the transfer means giving up seniority earned in the old unit since
seniority in the new unit is measured from the date of transfer. 10
In effect, the continued use of these unit-based seniority systems often
results in black workers being locked into poorly-paid, unskilled positions,
thereby perpetuating the effects of pre-act discrimination in the hiring and
promotion of blacks and other minority-group members.
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Teamsters v. United
States is to limit the impact of Title VII by excluding a number of seniority
systems from its coverage. This will result in many discriminated-against
employees no longer having standing to bring a complaint before E.E.O.C. or
in district court, and thus having no remedy to redress their grievance. This
result is contrary to, and frustrates, the purposes of the government's policy
of acting to eliminate discrimination in employment, a policy enacted into law
by Congress and the President.
This note reviews the legislative history of Title VII provisions pertaining
to seniority, as well as the decisions by the courts interpreting and defining
those seniority provisions. Focus is given to interpretations of Section 703(h)
of Title V11,11 a provision which excludes supposedly bona fide seniority systems
from coverage under Title VII, with particular reference to the Teamsters decision.
The conclusion sets forth a suggestion for an amendment to Title VII which
would adhere to the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the goals
and legislative purposes of Title VII.
7. E.g., promoting efficiency, encouraging employees to remain within the company to obtain advancements,
and limiting the amount of employee retraining. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Incorporated, 279 F.Supp.
505, 513 (E.D. Va. 1968).
8. E.g., Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Incorporated, 279 F. Supp. at 508, 512; Local 189, United Papermakers
& Pa rworkers v. United States, 416 F. 2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970).
9. E.g. Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 508, 512-513; United Papermakers, 416 F.2d at 983-984.
10. Another form of restrictive transfer provision permits the transferee to carry his accrued seniority to
the new unit, but limits the number of transfers to a small number per month or per year. See Quarles,
279 F.Supp. at 512.
11. §703(h) of Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h).
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Whether unit seniority systems constitute unlawful employment practices
within the meaning of Title VII turns upon the construction of the statutory
provisions concerning seniority systems. Section 703(a) of Title VII states that
it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to segregate or
classify employees or applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 12 By itself, Section 703(a) would clearly indicate that unit
seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of pre-act discrimination constitute
unlawful employment practices. 13 Congress, however, sought to clarify the
operation of Section 703 (a) as it affects bona fide seniority systems, reflected
in Section 703(h). The pertinent portion of Section 703(h) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision in this title, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona
fide seniority or 'merit system . . . , provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin ...
The legislative history of Title VII, especially that regarding Section 703(h),
is admittedly sparse. Problems in determining the proper construction of Section
703(h) have in large part resulted from its inadequate legislative history,
contained primarily in statements in Congress rather than in Congressional
committee reports.
14
The House version of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, H.R. 7152, did not
contain Section 703(h) when reported by the House Judiciary Committee1 5 or
when passed by the full House. 16 During its consideration of H.R. 7152, the
House made only passing reference to seniority rights.
17
The subject of seniority rights became a matter of more serious contention
during the Senate debate on H.R. 7152.18 A small number of Senators, including
12. The full text of §703(a), codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a), provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or I .
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment iii any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his .status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."
§703(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. §2003-2(b), contains similar proscriptions regarding employment practices
of labor organizations.
13. Federal courts on several occasions have held that a neutral policy which perpetuated pre-act racial
discrimination constitutes an unlawful employment practice. See generally U.S. v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l. Ass'n., Local No. 36 et al.,'416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Afro-American Patrolman's League
v. Dick, 503 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 243 (10th
Cir. 1970); Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office, Ford Motor Co., 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971);
United States v. IBEW, Local No. 38, et. al, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S.
943 (1970); Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l. Ass'n. Local No. 65, 489 F.2d (6th Cir. 1973).
14. Vaas, Francis J., "Title VII: The Legislative History, " 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431, 457 (1966).
15. H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
16. 110 Cong. Rec. 2804 (1964).
17. E.g., H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 65-66, 71 (1963) (minority report) and Remarks of
Representative John Dowdy, (D., Texas), 110 Cong. Rec. 2726 (Title VII would upset seniority
systems); Remarks of Representative Emanuel Celler (D., New York), 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964)
(Title VII would not affect seniority systems).
18. See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 759-762' (1976).
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the late Minority Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen, feared that Section 703(h)
proscriptions of unlawful employment practices would require preferential
treatment of minorities. Senate concerns included the belief that Title VII
would require employers to fire white workers in order to remedy the effects
of pre-act discrimination in hiring, thereby upsetting the traditional seniority
lay-off and recall practices. 19
Senator Joseph S. Clark (D., Pennsylvania), floor manager for Title VII,
attempted to quiet these fears of reverse discrimination. 20 His response includes
the introduction of three documents into the Congressional Record. These were
a set of answers to questions posed by Senator Dirksen, a memorandum
submitted by the Justice Department, and a memorandum prepared jointly by
Senators Clark and Clifford P. Case (R., New Jersey). The documents stressed
that Title VII would not be retrospective, but would apply prospectively to
employment practices occuring after its effective date.
Senator Clark's response to Senator Dirksen's questions regarding seniority
rights21 and the Justice Department's memorandum, 22 emphasized that Title
VII would not upset seniority rights concerning traditional lay-off and recall
practices. The Clark-Case memorandum 23 stressed that Title VII would not
require employers to fire white workers in order to remedy past discrimination.
19. E.g., Remarks of Senator Lister Hill, (D., Alabama), 110 Cong. Rec. 486-488 (1964); Remarks of
Senator John C. Stennis, (D., Mississippi)., 110 Cong. Rec. 7091 (1964).
20. Remarks of Senator Clark, 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964).
21. 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964). The pertinent portion reads:
"Question. Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions, when management function
is governed by a labor contract for promotions on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally,
labor contracts call for 'last hired, first fired.' If the last hired are Negroes, is the employer discriminating
if his contract requires they be first fired and the remaining employees are white?
"Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a 'last hired, first fired'
agreement a Negro happens to be the 'last hired' he can still be 'first fired' as long as it is done
because of his status as 'last hired' and not because of his race.
"Question. If an employer is directed to abolish his employment list because of discrimination
what happens to seniority?
"Answer. The bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to change existing
seniority lists."
22. Id. The pertinent portion of the Justice Department memorandum states:
"First, it has been asserted that title VII would undermine vested rights of seniority. This is not
correct. Title VII would have no effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that
in the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would not
be affected in the least by title VII. This would be true even in the case where owing to discrimination
prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes . . . . Of
course, if the seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful under title VII. If a rule
were to state that all Negroes must be laid off before any white man, such a rule could not serve
as the basis for a discharge subsequent to the effective date of the title. . . . But, in the ordinary
case, assuming that seniority rights were built up over a period of time during which Negroes were
not hired, these rights would not be set aside by the taking effect of title VII. Employers and labor
organizations would simply be under a duty not to discriminate against Negroes because of their race.
Any differences in treatment based on established seniority rights would not be based on race and
would not be forbidden by the title."
23. 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). The full text of the memorandum prepared by Senators Clark and Case
states:
"Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not
retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has
an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply
to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged - or indeed, permitted
- to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or once Negroes
are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
(However, where waiting lists for employment or training are, prior to the effective date of the title,
maintained on a discriminatory basis, the use of such lists after the title takes effect may be held an
unlawful subterfuge to accomplish discrimination."
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Instead, the Clark-Case memorandum indicated that the employers need only
fill future vacancies, i.e., those occuring after the effective date of Title VII,
on a nondiscriminatory basis.
The context of the debate indicates that Senate concern focused on the
effect of Title VII upon vested seniority rights which determine the job security
of white workers. The Senate resolved that Title VII would not require
preferential treatment of minorities, thereby eliminating the specter of reverse
discrimination in hiring future employees. 24 The Senate, however, did not
consider the effect of Title VII upon unit seniority systems which perpetuate
the effects of pre-act discrimination.
During the course of the Title VII debate, informal conferences were held
by the Senate leadership, headed by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, and
Minority Leader Dirksen.25 These conferences produced a substitute bill, with
amendments to H.R. 7152, the bill subsequently passed by both the
Senate and House and enacted into law. The Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill
contained Section 703(h). 26 While the amendments concerning Title VII were
intended to satisfy the objections of various Senators, especially those of Senator
Dirksen,27 the effect of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill was to clarify
rather than to alter the substantive provisions of Title VII. Remarks by the
late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, (D., Minnesota), one of the substitute
bill's authors, provide evidence of such intent regarding Section 703(h). Senator
Humphrey stated:
A new subsection 703(h) . . . has been added, providing that it is not an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to maintain different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment . . . pursuant to a seniority . . . system,
provided the differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate . . . The
change does not narrow the application of the title, but merely clarifies its
present intent and effect. 28
Further evidence that the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill was intended
only to clarify H.R. 7152 is contained in the record of "the House Rules
Committee29 regarding House Resolution 789,30 a resolution to adopt the Senate
version of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While no specific reference is made
to Section 703(h) or to seniority rights, the debate in the Rules Committee
indicates that a majority of its members believed the Senate amendments
merely clarified H.R. 7152. The comments of Representative Emanuel Celler,
then chairman of the House Rules Committee, are illustrative:
24. Similar concerns that Title VII mandated reverse discrimination prodeced another Mansfield-Dirksen
amendment, §7036), codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j). §703() states: "Nothing contained in this
title shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee subject to this title to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group because of the race, color, . . . or national origin of such individual or group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any
race, color, . . . or national origin employed by any employer . . . in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, . . . or national origin in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area."
Thus, §7036) provides further indication of Senate concern that Title VII be prospective, rather than
retrospective, in its operation.
25. Vaas, note 14, supra, at 445.
26. 110 Cong. Rec. 13310-13319 (1964) (Senate Amendment No. 1052).
27. See generally, Remarks of Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, 110 Cong. Rec. 6449-6551 (1964).
28. See generally, Remarks of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, 110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964).
29. H.R. Hearing on H. Res. 789, Committee on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
30. Id. at 1.
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[Als I have indicated, there are no great differences. Most of the 80 amendments
to H.R. 7152 have been clarifying amendments. They have been inconse-
quential.31
Thus, the legislative history of Section 703(h) indicates that Congress intended
to clarify the operation of Title VII by ensuring the title would not disturb
vested seniority rights which determine the job security of white workers. The
impact of Title VII upon black employees already employed in unskilled and
poorly paid jobs was not considered by Congress.
PRE-TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES DECISIONS
Following the enactment of Title VII, federal district courts and Courts
of Appeals, 32 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,33 and
commentators34 grappled with the question Congress did not consider. They
uniformly agreed that Section 703(h) was not intended to immunize unit
seniority systems which perpetuated pre-Act discrimination, locking black
employees into unskilled and poorly paid jobs.
The leading district court decision, Quarles v. Phillip Morris Incor-
porated35 established that unit seniority systems which perpetuate the effects
of pre-Act discrimination constitute unlawful employment practices.
In ascertaining the meaning of Section 703(h), the Quarles court noted
that several factors are evident from its legislative history:
First, it contains no express statement about departmental seniority. Nearly
all of the references are clearly to employment security. None of the excerpts
upon which the company and the union rely suggests that as a result of past
discrimination a Negro is to have employment opportunities inferior to those
of a white person who has less employment seniority. Second, the legislative
history indicates that a discriminatory seniority system established before the
act cannot be held lawful under the act.36
The Court concluded that while the legislative intent indicates that Title VII
does not require reverse discrimination, "Congress did not intend to freeze an
entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed
before the act." '3
7
The Quarles court provided two grounds for attacking unit seniority systems
in light of Section 703(h). First the court stated that while section 703(h)
"expressly states that the seniority system must be bona fide, . . . [njothing
in Section 703(h) or its legislative history, suggests that a racially discriminatory
seniority system established before the act is a bona fide seniority
system under the act."' 38 The Court held that "a departmental seniority
system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide seniority
system." 39
31. Id. at 10.
32. 431 U.S. at 378-379, notes 2-3 (Marshall, J., dissenting and concurring).
33. Id. at 380, note 4 (Marshall, J., dissenting and concurring).
34. Id., note 5 (Marshall, J., dissenting and concurring).
35. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Virginia 1968).
36. Id. at 516.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 517.
39. Id.
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Second, the court held that a seniority system which presently perpetuates
the effects of pre-act discriminatory practices constitutes an unlawful employment
practice, though the seniority did not have its "genesis in racial discrimination."
The court emphasized:
The differences between the terms and conditions of employment for white
and Negroes . . . are the result of an intention to discriminate in hiring
policies on the basis of race before January 1, 1966. The differences that
originated before the act are maintained now. The act does not condone
present differences that are the result of an intention to discriminate before
the effective date of the act, although such a provision could have been
included in the act had Congress so intended. 40
Subsequently, eight Circuit Courts of Appeals agreed with the Quarles,
rationale.41 These decisions tended to blend the two holdings of Quarles, finding
that seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of pre-act discrimination
are not bona fide within the meaning of Section 703(h), and therefore constitute
unlawful employment practices unless the defendant employer or union could
prove an overriding business necessity for their use.
The Courts of Appeals fashioned a "rightful place" remedy which carried
out the purposes of Title VII while adhering to Section 703(h) proscriptions
of reverse discrimination. One leading decision, Local 189, United Papermakers
and Paperworkers v. United States, 42 stated:
A "rightful place" theory stands between a complete purge of "but for" effects
and the maintenance of the status quo. The Act should be construed to prohibit
the future awarding of vacant jobs on the basis of a seniority system that
"locks in" prior racial classification. White incumbent workers should not be
bumped out of their present positions by Negroes with greater plant seniority;
plant seniority should be asserted only with respect to new job openings.43
In so doing, the courts dismantled unit seniority systems, replacing them
with plant-wide seniority systems tailored to assure that no employees would
have a right to a job he could not properly perform.44 Moreover, the rightful
place remedy in no way affected the employment security of white workers.
As United Papermakers emphasized:
It is one thing for legislation to require the creation of fictional seniority for
newly hired Negroes, and quite another thing for it to require that time
actually worked in Negro jobs be given equal status with time worked in
white jobs . . . No stigma of preference attaches to recognition of time actually
worked in Negro jobs as the equal of white time. 45
Thus, these- decisions appear to correctly adhere to Section 703(h) and its
legislative history, agreeing with Quarles that the treatment of seniority involves
problems different from those considered in the Senate debates. The granting
40. Id. at 517-518.
41. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits held in accordance
with Quarles. See 431 U.S. at 378, n.2 (Marshall, J. dissenting and concurring). Courts of Appeals
for the Seventh and Tenth Circuits indicated agreement in dicta. See Id. at 380 note 3. (Marshall,
J., dissenting and concurring).
42. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. Id. at 988. See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1260 (1967).
44. Id. at 985, 998.
45. Id. at 995.
19781
Journal of Legislation
of a "rightful place" also correctly adheres to Section 703(h), since it does
not challenge the employment security of white workers, i.e., does not require
employers and unions to engage in reverse discrimination. Instead, these decisions
merely ensure that black employees are not presently discriminated against,
permitting them to compete on an equal footing with their white counterparts.
TEAMSTERS Y. UNITED STATES
Through a misinterpretation of Section 703(h) and its legislative history,
the Supreme Court has given new meaning to this section in its Teamsters decision.
The full effect of Teamsters cannot be fully predicted, since both the E.E.O.C.
and federal district courts and Courts of Appeals have narrowly construed the
Supreme Court decision. 46 However, it is clear that Section 703(h) immunizes
otherwise lawful seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of pre-Act
discrimination.
In Teamsters, both the district court 47 and the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit 48 found that the defendant employer, T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., and
the defendant union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, had (f)
engaged in both pre- and post-act discriminatory hiring practices and (2) the
effects of this past discrimination were perpetuated by the collective bargaining
agreement which restricted inter-unit transfers.49
Similar to employers in the Quarles progeny, T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. organized
its trucking operations on the basis of units, with separate unit seniority for
line drivers (over the road drivers), maintenance personnel, and local city
drivers. 50 While company seniority controlled for the purpose of calculating
fringe benefits, e.g. vacations and pensions, unit seniority controlled inter-unit
transfers and lay-off and recall priorities. 5 1
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit utilized the "rightful place"
remedy, holding that named black and chicano workers were entitled to bid
for future linedriver positions on the basis of their company seniority, thereby
dismantling the unit seniority system as it applied to inter-unit transfers.
Additionally, once a worker had transferred to a line-driver position, his
company seniority would be utilized for all purposes, including lay-off and
recall.52
46. See text accompanying note 68, infra.
47. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 6 FEP Cases 690 (N.D. Texas 1972). The District Court's
memorandum opinion is not officially reported.
48. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975).
49. The action was brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States, pursuant to §707(a),
42 U.S.C. §2000e-6(a).
At the time the suit was initiated, § 707(a) granted standing to the Attorney General to bring a
Title VII action whenever he had reasonable cause to believe any person or persons is engaged in a
pattern or practice of resistance to the full employment of any rights "secured" by Title VII. §707
was amended in 1972 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 107, 42 U.S.C.
§2000-6(c), to give the EEOC rather than the Attorney General standing to bring "pattern or practice"
suits against private employers. In 1974, the EEOC was substituted for the Attorney General for the
United States. 431 U.S. at 328-329, n. 1.
50. 431 U.S. at 329-330, note 3.
"51. Id. at 343-344.
52. Id. at 333.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to petitions by T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc.
and the Teamsters. 53 In a seven-to-two decision, the majority reversed that
portion of the Court of Appeals decision concerning Section 703(h) and upheld
the seniority system as lawful.
Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart noted that the purpose of
Title VII is to eliminate discriminatory employment practices and that but for
Section 703(h), the employer's unit seniority system would constitute an unlawful




Where, because of the employer's prior intentional discrimination, the line
drivers with the longest tenure are without exception white, the advantages
of the seniority system flow disproportionately to them and away from Negro
and Spanish-surnamed employees who might by now have enjoyed those
advantages had not the employer discriminated before the passage of the Act.
This disproportionate distribution of advantages does in a very real
sense "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices." 55
The majority, however, concluded that "both the literal terms of . . . [Section]
703(h) and the legislative history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress
considered this very effect of many seniority systems and extended a measure
of immunity to them."'56
The court majority admitted that the legislative history "did not address
the specific issue presented by this case."' 57 But the majority construed 'eferences
in the legislative history that Title VII would not affect seniority rights to
include both plantwide and unit seniority systems.58 Justice Stewart stated:
In sum, the unmistakeable purpose of . . . [Section] 703(h) was to make clear
that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not be
unlawful under Title VII. As the legislative history shows, this was the intended
result even where the employer's pre-Act discrimination resulted in whites
having greater existing seniority rights than Negroes.59
In order to justify its broad reading of Section 703(h), the majority rejected
the key holdings of the Quarles progeny. First, the majority rejected holdings
that a unit seniority system was not bona fide within the meaning of Section
703(h) if it perpetuated the effects of pre-Act discrimination. Justice Steward
stated:
53. 425 U.S. 990 (1976).
54. 431 U.S. at 348-349.
55. Id. at 349-350.
56. Id. at 350
57. Id. at 354, n. 39.
58. Id. at 355, n. 41.
59. Id. at 332. The Supreme Court also extended §703(h) immunization to seniority systems' which
perpetuate the effects 'of past-act discrimination. 431 U.S. at 347-348. This application-of §703(h) is
clearly erroneous as noted by Justice Marshall's separate opinion, dissenting in regard to §703(h).
Id. 383-385. However, past-act victims of discrimination can obtain retroactive seniority dating back
to their date of hire or the effective date of Title VII, whichever, is earlier. See
Franks v. Bowman, Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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We cannot accept the invitation to disembowal .. . [Section] 703(h) by reading
the words "bona fide" as the Government would have us do. Accordingly, we
hold that an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become
unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrim-
ination. 60
Second, the Court rejected holdings which distinguished the protection of
employment security of white workers (a result clearly mandated by the
legislative history) from the immunization of unit seniority systems (a subject
beyond the scope of the legislative history). Justice Stewart states:
Although there seems to be no explicit reference in the legislative history to
pre-Act discriminatees already employed in less desirable jobs, there can be
no rational basis for distinguishing their claims from those of persons initially
denied any job but hired later with less seniority. 61
While the majority did not overtly reverse the Quarles progeny, in a
footnote to its decision it severely limited these holdings "as resting upon the
proposition that a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of pre-Act
discrimination cannot be bona fide if an intent to discriminate entered into
its very adoption."' 62 Moreover, the majority did not delineate what factors
need be considered in establishing the existence of such intent. In another
portion of the opinion, however, the majority briefly noted several factors it
considered relevant to holding that the unit seniority system in
Teamsters was bona fide. Justice Stewart stated:
The seniority system applies equally to all races and ethnic groups. To the
extent that it "locks" employees into nonline-driver jobs, it does so for
all . . . The placing of the line drivers in a separate bargaining unit from
other employees is rational and in accord with NLRB precedents. It is conceded,
that the seniority system did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and
that it was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.
In these circumstances the single fact that the system extends no retroactive
seniority to pre-Act discriminatees does not make it unlawful. 63
Thus, the majority opinion did not clearly define the impact of its
Teamsters decision, but left such impact an open question to be answered by
subsequent federal court decisions.
The thrust of the separate opinion by Justice Thurgood Marshall, 64 which
dissented in regard- to the proper interpretation of Section 703(h), stressed the
majority's misreading of the legislative history and warned that Teamsters would
have a severe impact upon discriminated-against employees. Noting that the
majority conceded that the legislative history did not consider the question
presented in the instant case, Justice Marshall considers what choice Congress
would have made had they considered the impact of Title VII upon unit
seniority systems. Justice Marshall observed:
60. Id. at 353-354. The majority also noted: "For the same reason, we reject the contention that the
proviso in §703(h), which bars differences in treatment resulting from 'an intention to discriminate,'
applies to any application of a seniority system that may perpetuate past discrimination . . . 431
U.S. at 353, n. 38.
61. Id. at 359.
62. Id. at 346, n. 28.
63. Id. at 355-356.
64. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the separate opinion.
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To answer that question, the devasting impact of today's holding validating
such systems must be fully understood . . . In many factories, blacks were
hired as laborers while whites were trained and given skilled positions; in the
transportation industry blacks could only become porters; and in steel plants
blacks were assigned to the coke ovens and blasting furnaces . . .The Court
holds in essence; that while after 1965 these incumbent employees are entitled
to an equal opportunity to advance to more .desirable jobs, to take advantage
of that opportunity they must pay a price: they must surrender the seniority
they have accumulated in their old jobs. For many, the price will be too high,
and they will be locked into their previous positions. Even those willing to
pay the price will have to reconcile themselves to being forever behind
subsequently hired whites who were not discriminatorily assigned. Thus equal
opportunity will remain a distant dream for all incumbent em-
ployees. 65
Justice Marshall concluded: "I am in complete agreement with Judge Butzner's
conclusion in his seminal decision in Quarles . . . : 'It is . . . apparent that
Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation into discriminatory
patterns that existed before the Act."
'66
However, in a footnote, Justice Marshall stated:
I agree with the Court . . . that the results in a large number of the
Quarles line of cases can survive today's decision. That the instant seniority
system "is rational, in accord with the industry practice, . . . consistent with
NLRB precedents, . . .did not have its genesis in racial discrimination,
and . . . was negotiated had been maintained free from any illegal
purpose," . . . distinguishes the facts of this case from those in many of the
prior decisions.6
7
Justice Marshall's inconsistent statement undercuts the thrust of his dissent
and represents any overly broad summarization of the majority opinion. Thus,
the separate opinion, like that of the majority, leaves open the possibility that
not all unit seniority systems are immunized by Section 703(h).
POST-TEAMSTERS INTERPRETATIONS
As noted earlier, both the E.E.O.C. and recent lower court decisions have
attempted to limit the effect of the Supreme Court's Teamsters decision.
Whether such interpretations will survive the scrutiny of the Supreme Court
remains an open question.
A. E.E.O.C. Interpretative Memorandum
Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its Teamsters decision, the
E.E.O.C. issued an interpretative memorandum stating that the decision applies
only if (1) the seniority system was established prior to the effective date of
Title VII and (2) evidence shows that there was no discrimination in the
genesis or, maintenance of the seniority system. 68
65. 431 U.S. at 387-388. (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
66. Id. at 389-390.
67. Id. at 379-380, note 3.
68. 97 S.Ct. at 1881
19781
Journal of Legislation
The E.E.O.C. interpretative memorandum gives a broad definition to the
term intent to discriminate, which would further limit the application of
Teamsters. The memorandom asserted:
In examining possible discriminatory intent, the commission will review all
available evidence including the respondents' collective bargaining history and
employment practices. Where union or units were previously segregated,
discriminatory intent in the institution of a unit seniority system will be
inferred.69
Additionally, the memorandum stated:
When a seniority system is in effect and the employer or union is made aware
that it is lacking in minorities or females, discriminatory intent will be inferred
if the system is maintained or renegotiated when an alternative system is
available. 70
The E.E.O.C. interpretative memorandum represents an obvious attempt
to limit the effect of Teamsters upon the E.E.O.C. ability to enter into
conciliation agreements, consent decrees, and settlement agreements which
require the dismantling of unit seniority systems. 71 While Teamsters apparently
frames future considerations of the effect of Section 703(h) in terms of intent,
the E.E.O.C. definition of intent to discriminate appears too expansive in light
of this decision. The Supreme Court has held that such E.E.O.C. interpretations
should be afforded "great deference."' 72 But its recent decisions in Teamsters
and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 73 which rejected E.E.O.C. interpretations,
casts doubt on the effect of this memorandum.
B. Lower Court Decisions
Recent lower court decisions have agreed that unit seniority systems are
bona fide only if evidence shows that there was no discrimination in the genesis
or maintenance of the seniority system. Additionally, they have required that
departmentalization into particular units be in accord with industry practice.
However, these decisions have not adopted the E.E.O.C. definition of intent
to discriminate, relying instead on. factors briefly mentioned in Teamsters. 75
In James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 76 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit noted:
As we read the [Teamsters] opinion, the issue whether there has been purposeful
discrimination in connection with the establishment or continuation of a seniority
system is integral to a determination that the system is or is not bona
fide.7
7
69. 46 U.S.L.W. 202- (July 19, 1977).
70. Id. at 2028.
71. Prior to Teamsters, the EEOC utilizied conciliation agreements, consent decrees, and settlement
agreements as major weapons in attacking discriminatory unit seniority systems. See e.g., Conciliation
agreement: EEOC and Atlantic Steel (January 7, 1969), reprinted at 8 FEP Manual, §431:60(c)
(conciliation agreement); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., Daily Labor Report
(April 15, 1974) (consent decree); AT&T Bias Settlement (January 7, 1969) 8 FEP Manual, §431:73
(settlement agreement).
72. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
73. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
74. See notes 76 and 82, infra.
75. See text accompanying note 63, supra.
76. 559 F.2d (5th Cir. 1977).
77. Id. at 351.
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The Fifth Circuit indicated that the above necessitates a case by case
analysis of seniority systems in light of Section 703(h). "ITihe totality of
circumstances in the development and maintenance of the system is relevant
to examining that issue."
78
The Court of Appeals stated:
In . . .[Teamsters] the Court focused on four factors:
1) whether the seniority system operates to discourage all employees equally from
transferring between seniority units;
2) whether the seniority units are in the same or separate bargaining units (if
the latter, whether that structure is rational and in conformance with industry
practice);
3) whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrimination;
4) whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained free from any
illegal purpose. 79
In James, the Court of Appeals found that (1) the seniority system was
adopted when segregation in the South was standard operating procedure,
thereby having its genesis in discrimination and (2) the unit seniority system
did not consist of separate and distinct bargaining units that correspond to
industry practice.80 The Court remanded the case for further consideration in
light of Teamsters and its own decision in James.
81
Recent district court and Court of Appeals decisions seem in accord with
James, having considered the issue of intent to discriminate and relied on one
or more of the James factors in this determination.8 2 Despite the apparent
consistency of post-Teamsters precedents, the vagueness of the Supreme Court
decision concerning what factors need be considered to establish discriminatory
intent casts doubt on whether the Supreme Court will follow these decisions
at a later date.
ALTERNATIVES IN LIEU OF TITLE VII
While Teamsters limits the ability of the government and aggrieved plaintiffs
to attack discriminatory unit seniority systems, several alternatives in lieu of
Title VII need be considered. These include enforcement of Executive Order
No. 11246 by the U. S. Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract
Compliance (O.F.C.C.), actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
and actions brought under state fair employment practice acts.
78. Id. at 352.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 352-353.
81. Id. at 353.
82: Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 15 FEP cases 795 (N.D. Indiana 1977) (seniority system with genesis
in discrimination); Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 437 F.Supp. 1138 (1977) E.D. Pennsylvania
(no evidence of genesis in discrimination); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 15 FEP cases 144 (N.D.
Alabama 1977) (seniority system without genesis in discrimination, not maintained discriminatarily, in
accord with industry practice, and affects all employees regardless of race); Dickerson v. United States
Steel Corp., 439 F.Supp. 55 (E.D. Pennsylvania 1977) (no evidence that seniority system not rational
or not in accord with industry practice); United States v. East Texas Motor Freight System, 564 F.2d
179 (5th Cir. 1977) (seniority system not maintained with discriminatory intent); Alexander v.
Machinists, Aera Lodge 735, 15 FEP Cases (6th Cir. 1977). (Seniority system not established or
maintained with discriminatory intent and affects all employees regardless of race).
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A. Executive Order No. 11246
If Executive Order No. 11246 remains unaffected by Teamsters, O.F.C.C.
enforcement of this order may provide a successful mode of circumventing the
Teamsters decision. Following the Teamsters decision, O.F.C.C. issued a policy
directive to its officers, concluding "that the opinion is not applicable to
Executive Order 11246, as amended." O.F.C.C. based this conclusion on the
ground that "the Executive Order does not contain an exemption comparable
to Section 703(h)." Therefore O.F.C.C. viewed Teamsters "as a narrow decision
based on the exemption."
'83
Executive Order No. 11246, issued by President Lyndon B. Johnson in
1965, requires that every government contract include the following provision:
The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are
employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard
to their race, color . . , or national origin. Such action shall include, but
not be limited to, the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or
transfer .... 84 I
Additionally, government contracts must contain the following enforcement
provision:
In the event of the contractor's noncompliance with the nondiscrimination
clauses of this contract or with any of such rules, regulations, or orders,
this contract may be .cancelled, terminated or suspended in whole or in part
and the contractor may be declared ineligible for further Government
contracts . ... 85
,O.F.C.C. regulations require that contracts of $50 thousand or more must
be accompanied by written affirmative action programs, including plans for
remedying existing discrimination. 86 Often affirmative action plans include
alteration of unit seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of pre-act
discrimination. While the regulations indicate that failure to meet these self
imposed goals does not constitute noncompliance, the contractor must exercise
good faith in reaching the goals.
8 7
Decisions prior to Teamsters regarding the relationship between Title VII
and Executive Order No. 11246 would appear to indicate that Teamsters should
not affect O.F.C.C. enforcement actions. In Contractors Association of Eastern
Pennsylvania88 v. Secretary of Labor, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit stated: "Section . . . 703(h) is a limitation only upon Title VII not
upon other remedies."'89 Additionally, the Supreme Court has upheld the
government's broad power to fix the terms and conditions of government
contracts in cases not involving Executive Order No. 11246.90
83. Policy directive from Office of Federal Contract Compliance to compliance officers (July 20, 1977).
84. 30 F.R. 12319, as amended by Executive Order No. 11375, 32 F.R. 14303, §202(1).
85. Id., §202(6).
86. 41 C.F.R. §60-2 et seq.
87. Id.
88. 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
89. Id. at 172.
90. E.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
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Since Teamsters, two decisions have reached inconsistent conclusions. A
district court decision has indicated that Section 703(h) does not limit O.F.C.C.
enforcement efforts. There the court stated: "Title VII is intended to govern
only private contracts, and not contracts with the government." 91
But in United States v. East Texas Motor Freight System, 92 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Section 703(h) limits O.F.C.C.
enforcement of Executive Order No. 11246 against discriminatory unit seniority
systems. The Court stressed:
The argument that Executive Order No. 11246 is unaffected by Section 703(h)
cannot be accepted because Congress has declared for a policy that a bona
fide seniority system shall be lawful. The Executive may not, in defiance of
such policy, make unlawful-or penalize-a bona fide seniority system.
93
Thus, the ability of O.F.C.C. to enforce Executive Order No. 11246 in
the face of Teamsters, must be questioned. If the Fifth Circuit's rationale is
followed in other decisions, O.F.C.C. enforcement as an alternative remedy
will be foreclosed.
B. Civil Rights Act of 1866
Another alternative in lieu of Title VII is attacking unit seniority systems
by actions brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified at 42
U.S.C. Section 1981. Lower court decisions before and after Teamsters, however,
indicate that 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 must be interpreted in light of Section
703(h) of Title VII.
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 94 the Supreme Court
expressly held that 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 affords a federal remedy against
racial discrimination in private employment. 95 The Supreme Court also held
in Johnson that Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 provide "separate,
distinct, and independent" remedies.
96
While, the Supreme Court has not considered the issue, lower courts have
held that 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 should be interpreted in accordance with
the provisions of Title VII, including Section 703(h). Prior to Teamsters, Courts
of Appeals for the Second97 and Seventh 98 Circuits held that Section 703(h)
protected the traditional last-in, first-out operation of traditional plant-wide
seniority systems. Both decisions noted that since the seniority systems involved
were lawful under Title VII, no violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 had
occured.
Recent district court decisions, 99 handed down after Teamsters, indicate
that unit seniority systems: protected by the Supreme Court's expanded view
91. Crown Zellerbach Corporation v. Marshall, 15 FEP Cases 1628, 1636 (E.D. Louisiana 1977).
92. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
93. Id. at 185.
94. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
95. Id. at 459-460.
96. Id. at 461.
97. Chance v. Board of Examiners and Board of Education, Etc., 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976).
98. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
99. Croker v. Boeing Co., (Vertol Div.), 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pennsylvania 1977); Dickerson v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 439 F.Supp. 55 (E.D. Pennsylvania 1977); Dickerson, 437 Supp. at 73; Winfield v. St.
Joe Paper Co., 16 FEP cases 1497 (N.D. Florida 1977).
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of Section 703(h) are not violative of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. One decision
concluded: "if the system cannot be challenged under Title VII, it follows that
it also is immune from attack from Section 1981l.400 Subsequent to
Teamsters this issue has not been considered by either the Supreme Court or
a Court of Appeals. However, it seems that the above rationale forecloses the
42 U.S.C. Section 1981 alternative.
C. State Contract Conditions and Fair Employment Acts
Another alternative is attacking unit seniority systems by actions in state
courts brought pursuant to state fair employment acts. 101 While Title VII
expressly provides that it does not preempt state law, the federal preemption
doctrine, as applied to labor law matters, may foreclose this remedy.
Section 708 of Title VII, codified at 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-7, provides:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future
law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law
which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an
unlawful employment practice under this title.102
The legislative purpose of this section was to ensure the validity, of state fair
employment practice acts, indicating that federal law does not preempt state
fair employment practice acts. 10 3.
To date, the cases interpreting Section 708 have not considered whether
a fair employment practice act which proscribes discriminatory unit seniority
systems is preempted by Section 703(h). While the statutory language of
Section 708 and its legislative history does not preclude this alternative remedy,
the question awaits judicial resolution.
A more serious challenge to employing state fair employment acts is the
labor law doctrine of federal preemption. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (NLRA), 104 preempts
state laws regarding similar matters. Thus, the application of state fair
employment practice acts to otherwise valid seniority systems may be preempted
by the NLRA.
In San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 105 the Supreme Court stated the general
preemption doctrine:
100. Croker and Dickerson reach the same result as Chance and Waters by applying the Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments standard of intent to discriminate to
42 U.S.C. §1971. The Washington standard is greater than that, of Title VII, which only requires
proof of discriminatory effect. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Therefore, if a
seniority system cannot be challenged under the more lenient Griggs standard, it cannot be challenged
under the Washington standard.
101. For comparative study and texts of state fair employment practice acts, see 8a FEP Manual, §451
et seq.
102. §1104 of Title X1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains a similar provision. §1104, codified at
42 U.S.C. §2000h-4 states:
"Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws
on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any
provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any purposes of the Act, or any
provisions thereof."
103'. Remarks of Senator Case, 110 Cong. Rec. 7243 (1964); Remarks of Senator Humphrey, 110 Cong.
Rec. 12721 (1964).
104. 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq.
105. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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When an activity is arguably subject to ... [Section] 7 or . .. [Section]
8 of the National Labor Relations Act, the States as well as the federal
courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted. 106
Pursuant to Section 8 and Section 9 of the NLRA, the employer and
majority union are under a duty to collectively bargain concerning wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.10 7 Failure to bargain
in good faith about these mandatory provisions constitutes an unfair labor
practice, invoking the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.10 8
The category of other terms and conditions of employment deals with the
relationship of employer and union, encompassing most aspects of the
employer-union relationship.10 9 .Since the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that seniority, promotions, and transfers are mandatory subjects about which
both the employer and union must bargain,l10 the general preemption doctrine
announced in Garmon would apply to unit seniority provisions.
The preemption doctrine, however, is riddled with exceptions. Many of the
exceptions involve the regulation of matters of deep local concern or matters
peripheral to purposes of the N.L.R.A. 1l ' Another class of exceptions involves
cases in which the preemption doctrine is overcome by another strong federal
policy, to be implemented by federal and/or state courts.11 2 Federal courts
may find that state fair employment practices constitute matters peripheral to
the purposes of the NLRA or that the federal policy announced in Section
708 overcomes the preemption doctrine.
CONCLUSION
It is as yet too early to discern the full effect of Teamsters upon black
and Chicano employees who are locked into their present jobs, the result of
unit seniority systems which perpetuate pre-act discriminatory hiring and
transfer policies. It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court's interpretation
of Section 703(h) immunizes discriminatory unit seniority systems, which, while
neutral on their face, operate to freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory
practices contrary to the purpose of Title VII.
106. 359 U.S. at 245.
107. §8(d), codified at 29 U.S.C. §158(d), and §9(a), codified at §159(a) require the employer and majority
union to bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment.
108. §8(a) (5), codified at 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5), states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of §9(a) of this title.
§8(b)(3), codified at 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(3), provides an identical unfair labor practice regarding labor
organizations and their agents.
109. See, R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, ch. XXI, §§1-5 (1976).
110. Katz v. N.L.R.B., 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
111. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-244.
112. e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 368 U.S. 171 (1967).
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Therefore, it is imperative that Congress amend Section 703(h) so that is
accurately reflects Congress's legislative intent. The following amendment,
emerging from an examination of Teamsters, is offered as a means of
accomplishing this goal:
Section 703(h). Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or employees
who work in different locations, provided that such 'differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin[.j A seniority system is not bona fide if it has its genesis in
such discrimination; exhibits such discrimination in its maintenance; or
perpetuates the effects of discriminatory diring, promotion, or transfer practices
engaged in prior to the effective date of this title ....
Additionally, the above amendment should be accompanied by full House
and Senate committee hearing reports, clearly deliniating the limited immunization
which Section 703(h) provides seniority systems and affirming the "rightful
place" remedy of the Quarles progeny. 113 By so doing, Congress will effectively
reverse the Teamsters decision and fulfill the legislative purposes of Title VII
as it relates to unit seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of pre-act
discrimination.
113. Committee hearing reports should also expressly indicate that §703(h). does not immunize seniority
systems which perpetuate the effects of post-Act discriminatory practices. See supra, note 59.
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